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NOTE
Ignoring the Soul of Brown: Board of Education v. Dowell
[At some point-perhaps in words that could connote either tri-
umph or despair-the court will come to say: it is finished.1
Public school desegregation may no. longer be front page news in
America, but its odyssey through the nation's courts is not yet finished.2
After decades of legally mandated separation of blacks and whites in
public schools, followed by a relatively short period of attempts to ra-
cially unify education by judicial action, a crucial turning point in the
social experiment begun with Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1)'
may be near.
For nearly forty years, American society has had an emotional in-
vestment in judicially supervised school desegregation. Depending upon
one's point of view, that investment has paid valuable dividends4 or has
1. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 798 (1986). In his article, Professor Gewirtz referred to terminating
federal district court supervision over school systems that have been ordered to remedy the
segregation of black and white students. He predicted that the termination issue would be-
come a crucial question in the civil rights field. Id. at 790. Professor Gewirtz has proved an
accurate prophet; Board of Education v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991), the first desegregation
case decided by the Supreme Court in more than a decade, turned squarely on the question of
when judicial supervision should end. See infra notes 12-19 & 52-89 and accompanying text.
2. The ongoing litigation surrounding Oklahoma City's public schools is representative
of desegregation lawsuits. The suit originated as a class action in federal district court with a
black minor, Robert Dowell (bringing the action through his father), representing similarly
situated black children seeking to enjoin the operation of segregated public schools in
Oklahoma City. Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427, 428 (W.D. Okla. 1963). Initially,
limited attempts to alleviate the segregation of the city's public schools failed. See infra notes
27-37 and accompanying text. In Dowell v. Board of Education, 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D.
Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972), the district court
implemented a comprehensive plan centered on busing students to achieve racial balance in the
schools, and ordered the school board and those acting in concert with it not to deviate from
the plan and to obtain permission from the court before acting in any manner that might not
be in accordance with the plan. l. at 1273. Since 1985, the district court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court have struggled
with the issues of whether desegregation has been achieved in Oklahoma City and whether
control of the school system should be returned to local authorities. See infra notes 38-55 and
accompanying text.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Commentators have described the political, educational, and economic gains by
blacks since the 1950s, and point to studies indicating that racial intolerance has lessened
throughout the era of desegregation. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 774-78 (1976);
CHRISTINE H. RoSSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY
10-13 (1990).
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proved a dismal failure.' Both views have some merit, resulting in what
one commentator called a "moral standoff": 6 segregated public educa-
tion is wrong, but so is subjecting black and white schoolchildren to de-
segregation techniques, like busing, that disrupt and derogate their
education. Should the standoff end? Has desegregation been fully
achieved? If not, has America invested all the effort it cares to expend in
the courts, or should judicial control of desegregation continue? Plenty
of opportunities have arisen for America to answer these questions; as of
1988, more than a hundred cases were being litigated actively in the na-
tion's federal courts,7 and national and local officials have recently advo-
cated bringing this litigation to a close.' Faced with this pressure, courts
continue to search for a standard by which to measure how much pro-
gress school systems have made toward desegregation.9 The goal of de-
segregation-a "unitary" school system-has proved difficult to define,' 0
5. Another commentator has labelled early desegregation attempts as failures and advo-
cates the democratic process, rather than the judiciary, as the proper forum for race-related
policy. RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEG-
REGATION 273-89 (1984). As Mr. Wolters put it, "local officials would almost certainly im-
prove on the sorry record that disingenuous judges and naive reformers have made." Id. at
289.
6. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1954-78, at 132 (1979), quoted in James S. Liebman, Desegregating
Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1472 (1990).
7. For a comprehensive list of desegregation lawsuits compiled by the United States Jus-
tice Department, see Current Status of Federal School-Desegregation Lawsuits, EDUC. WK.,
June 1, 1988, at 18-19. This list was part of an announcement that the Justice Department
would seek the closing of over two hundred of the cases. Id. at 18.
8. The administrations of President Ronald Reagan and President George Bush have
promoted the issue of terminating judicial supervision of public education by arguing for ter-
mination before the courts and by entering into settlements with school boards that install
desegregation decrees that end after compliance for a set period of time. See Gewirtz, supra
note 1, at 790-91; Liebman, supra note 6, at 1465; supra note 7.
9. Before segregation can be cured, it is, of course, crucial to determine the harm of
segregation that requires remedying. This Note focuses on the general developmental harm to
separated black students: the "stigmatic injury" of an inferior, segregated education as cited
by Justice Marshall in Board of Education v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 642 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See infra notes 78-82 & 88-89 and accompanying text. For a scholarly treatment
of the various theories of the harm resulting from segregated education, see Liebman, supra
note 6, at 1474, 1484-1540.
10. The term "unitary" is generally construed to describe a school system that is in com-
plete compliance with the constitutional ban on legally mandated segregation of public educa-
tion. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991); Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968). Confusion over the terminology arose after the Supreme
Court's decision in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), which
seemed to suggest that a school district could be "unitary" in one area, such as student assign-
ment, without being "totally... unitary." Id. at 436-37; see infra note 136 and accompanying
text. In Dowell the Supreme Court briefly discussed the lower courts' confusion about what
the word "unitary" means, but declined to formulate a more precise definition. Dowell, 111 S.
Ct. at 635-36. Commentators have not been reluctant to attempt to define the term, however.
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and what a supervising court should do after a school system becomes
unitary1 has remained equally in doubt.
In Board of Education v. Dowell,12 the United States Supreme Court
answered only one of the questions: what should the district court do
once the school system is unitary? The Supreme Court held that judicial
See Hugh J. Beard, Jr., The Role of Res Judicata in Recognizing Unitary Status and Terminat-
ing Desegregation Litigation: A Response to the Structural Injunction, 49 LA. L. REv. 1239,
1241 (1989) (arguing that full compliance with a desegregation order should result in a finding
of unitary status); Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination
of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (1990) ("Unitary status is not so much a moment in time as it is a general
state of being."); Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and
the Finding of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. Rnv. 519, 534-35 (1987) ("[T]o achieve unitary
status, all aspects of the public education system must be freed of the effects of state-sponsored
racial segregation. [Unitary status] is not solely a matter of whether white children and black
children go to school together." (citation omitted)); G. Scott Williams, Note, Unitary School
Systems and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 794, 795-
99 (1987) (arguing that unitary status may have a "short-term" definition-implementing and
maintaining a desegregation plan; or a "long-term" definition--establishing permanent
changes in a school system).
11. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have split over the question of whether a district judge's
finding that a school system is unitary automatically dissolves any existing desegregation or-
ders and ends the district court's jurisdiction. Compare Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d
1516, 1520 (10th Cir.) (desegregation orders and jurisdiction continue after a finding of unitary
status if not expressly ended), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986), with Riddick v. School Bd.,
784 F.2d 521, 534-35, 538-39 (4th Cir.) (jurisdiction ends automatically once unitary status is
found), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). In Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991),
the Supreme Court sided with the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 636; see infra note 15 and accompany-
ing text.
Commentators have advocated retention of some powers by the district court after uni-
tary status is found, see, e.g., Chandler, supra note 10, at 555 (arguing that in some instances
the court should retain full supervisory power for some time after the school system is uni-
tary), or even after active supervision is ended. See, e.g., Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof
After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. Rav. 653, 668-
69 (1987) (arguing that a presumption of intent to discriminate should be retained and applied
to school board action that substantially resegregates schools).
12. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). There have been many cases involving the class of plaintiffs
represented by Robert Dowell and the Oklahoma City school board. The original suit was
brought in 1963. Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963); see supra note 2.
Since then, the case has been heard a number of times at the district, appellate, and Supreme
Court level. See, e.g., Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965) (ordering
affirmative remedies), aff'd in part, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 (W.D. Okla.) (implementing a remedial
plan known as the "Finger Plan"), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041
(1972); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (denying plaintiffs'
motion to reopen the case), rev'd and remanded, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 938 (1986); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (refusing on
remand to reopen the case), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1991).
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control of public education should be temporary,13 observing that the
supervising district court should find the Oklahoma City school board in
compliance with the Constitution if the school system has cooperated
with existing desegregation decrees and eliminated past discrimination to
the extent practicable. 4 The Court pointed out that a finding of consti-
tutional compliance-unitary status-would not automatically end liti-
gation, since plaintiffs and school boards are entitled to an express,
"precise statement" of the termination of a desegregation order."5 The
Court made it clear, however, that both existing orders and the district
court's jurisdiction should end once the school system is unitary, because
at that point the purpose of the litigation would be achieved. 6 The
Court's opinion attributed great weight to local interests in controlling
public education and held that dissolving desegregation decrees after a
reasonable period of compliance by a school board properly recognized
the importance of local interests. 17 In setting guidelines for deciding uni-
tary status,' 8 however, the Supreme Court's opinion was disappointingly
cursory and slighted the central aim of Brown I: to eliminate the injury
to segregated black students resulting from loss of the intangible benefits
of an equal and integrated education. 9
This Note recounts past judicial treatment of the desegregation of
public education,2" with emphasis on aspects of the federal courts' deci-
sions that pertain to the goals and successes of desegregation and the
importance of local interests in education.2 The Note focuses on the
courts' recognition of the intangible injury of segregated education,
harms that cannot be measured quantitatively.22 The Note analyzes the
13. Dowell, 11 S. Ct. at 637 ("[Desegregation] decrees... are not intended to operate in
perpetuity.").
14. Id. at 638.
15. Id. at 636.
16. Id. at 636-37.
17. Id. at 637.
18. Essentially the Court dictated a two-part test for the district court to apply: (1) check
the school board's compliance with existing orders, and (2) check for the elimination of past
vestiges of legally mandated segregation. See supra text accompanying note 14. The Court's
failure to expand on the second prong of the test is the subject of criticism in this Note. See
infra notes 70-77 & 172-179 and accompanying text.
19. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
20. See infra notes 90-165 and accompanying text. For brief but informative accounts of
the Supreme Court's role in school desegregation, see Wiley A. Branton, The History and
Future of School Desegregation, Remarks Prepared For Delivery Before the Eighth Circuit
Judicial Conference (July 25, 1985), in 109 F.R.D. 241, 243-46 (1986); Chandler, supra note
10, at 522-30; Drew S. Days, III, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody
Laughing?, 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1742-53 (1986) (book review).
21. See infra notes 102-165 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 92-107 & 160-165 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Education v. Dowell,2 3 not-
ing particularly the standards adopted for evaluating the success of judi-
cial supervision of the desegregation of public education and, ultimately,
for determining when such supervision should be terminated.24 The
Note concludes that the Dowell Court properly weighed local autonomy
in evaluating the goals of desegregation, but faults the Court for impos-
ing an overly mechanical test for determining the achievement of deseg-
regation upon the lower federal courts.25 Finally, this Note proposes a
compromise between local autonomy and judicial supervision: a district
court must analyze intangible factors such as community attitudes to-
ward the school system before deciding unitary status, and then, if uni-
tary status is granted, the court should return active control of the
schools to local authorities, while preventing resegregation by retaining
power through narrowly drawn permanent injunctions or an evidentiary
mechanism that favors the plaintiffs.26
In 1961, a group of black schoolchildren challenged 27 the racial seg-
regation of Oklahoma City's public schools in federal district court.2"
The district court found that a dual school system existed 9 and ordered
a limited remedy.3" Because the order was rendered ineffective by school
23. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
24. See infra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
27. Court-ordered school desegregation is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[W]e hold that
the plaintiffs... are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
28. Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963). School segregation had
been enforced by law since Oklahoma entered the union. Id. at 431. The Oklahoma Constitu-
tion empowered the state legislature to create racially separated schools. OKLA. CONST. art.
XIII, § 3 (repealed 1966). State statutes enacted pursuant to the constitutional provision in-
cluded a system of fines for the related misdemeanors of maintaining or teaching in an inte-
grated school. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 5-1 to 5-11 (repealed 1965); see Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at
431-33. The Oklahoma constitutional provision and statutes were declared unconstitutional
and void by the district court. Id. at 433.
29. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 431, 444-46. A dual school system is characterized by racially
separate programs-a "white" school program and a "black" school program within one sys-
tem. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) ("Racial identification of the
system's schools was complete .... [T]he State, acting through the local school board and
school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part 'white' and part 'Negro.' ").
The Oklahoma City school board had resolved in 1955 to discontinue separate schools,
Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 434, but eight years later the district court found "no tangible evidence
[of] a good faith effort to integrate the public schools" other than the resolution. Id. at 435.
30. The district court ordered the Oklahoma City school system to enroll the black plain-
tiff, Robert Dowell, in the predominantly white high school from which he had been banned
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board inaction,31 the district court reopened the case and ordered affirm-
ative remedies to end the dual system: the installation of a minority-to-
majority transfer plan,3 2 the redrawing of certain school-zone boundaries
to overcome the effects of residential segregation, and the assignment of
faculty so that the ratio of non-white to white teachers at each school
would reflect the system-wide ratio. 3
Nine years after its initial order, finding a dual system still in
place,34 the district court implemented a remedial scheme proposed by
the plaintiffs, known as the "Finger Plan."' 5 The Oklahoma City school
board complied with the Finger Plan until 1977, when it moved to close
the case and terminate the district court's jurisdiction.36 The district
court declared the school system to be unitary and apparently relin-
quished jurisdiction.37
Nevertheless the school district continued to operate under the Fin-
by Oklahoma law. The court also ordered the school system to desist from allowing white
children to transfer out of predominantly black schools without a good-faith reason and to
integrate the staff and faculty of all schools. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 447.
31. Three court-appointed experts in education reported that transfer policies allowing
whites to avoid assignment to black schools were still in place and that desegregation of facul-
ties had taken place on only a "token basis." Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971, 973-74
(W.D. Okla. 1965), aff'd in part, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
The school board's resistanice to desegregation went beyond inaction. Thirteen recently-
opened elementary schools were one-race schools, and construction plans called for eight new
facilities to open in all-white neighborhoods. Id. at 975-76.
32. The minority-to-majority transfer plan allowed any student who was a member of the
racial majority in her school to transfer to another school in which her race was in the minor-
ity. Id. at 977.
33. Id. at 977-78. Prior to ordering the adjustment of school zones, the court determined
that the school district's use of neighborhood school zones in the past had contributed to
residential segregation. Id. at 976-77.
34. At the beginning of the 1971 school year, the Oklahoma City school system operated
86 elementary schools; 53 schools had a student population over 90% white and 16 had a
student population over 95% black. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60
(W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
35. Id. at 1273. Named for its creator and plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. John Finger, the
Finger Plan assigned black children in the first through fourth grades to formerly all-white
schools, and assigned white children in the fifth grade to formerly all-black schools. If a neigh-
borhood elementary school was integrated, it was designated as a "stand-alone" school-a
neighborhood school unaffected by the decree-for all grades. Id, at 1267-68, 1273; see also
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1971) (affirming District
Judge McMillan's decision to order a variation of the Finger Plan in the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg County, North Carolina school system).
36. See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633-34.
37. Dowell v. School Bd., No. CIV-9452 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 1977). For quotations
from this unpublished "Order Terminating Case," see Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633-34. The order
did not expressly dissolve the 1972 decree. Id. For discussions of the scholarly debate over
whether a finding of unitary status automatically ends a desegregation order and the court's
jurisdiction, see supra note 11; infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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ger Plan until 1985.38 That year, the Oklahoma City school board
adopted a new student-assignment -plan that eliminated busing of stu-
dents in grades one through four and reassigned those students to neigh-
borhood schools.3 9 Establishing the neighborhood school zones resulted
in a substantial number of one-race schools," prompting the plaintiffs to
move that the original suit be reopened.41 The district court denied the
motion.42 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the district court, holding that the 1977 declaration of unitary
status did not vacate the 1972 injunction implementing the Finger
Plan.43 The Tenth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to challenge the new
assignment plan as discriminatory.'
38. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634, 641; Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1505
(V.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
39. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634, 641; Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1505. Curiously, the school
board justified discontinuing the Finger Plan in part because of the projected success in deseg-
regation. The board predicted that residential integration would increase and therefore antici-
pated creating 13 new "stand-alone" schools. Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1514. More "stand-
alone" schools would mean fewer students in the fifth-grade centers in predominantly black
neighborhoods, and subsequently, those centers risked closing. Id. Also, with more "stand-
alone" schools in central Oklahoma City, the distance that students would be bused to other
schools would increase. Id.
Although the plaintiffs recognized that the Finger Plan "ultimately proved inequitable",
id., they argued that this did not justify ending court-supervised efforts entirely, but only justi-
fied modifying the plan to continue to foster desegregation, id. at 1524-26.
40. Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1509-10. Of 64 elementary schools created, 11 schools had a
student population greater than 95% black, five of which were greater than 99% black. Eight-
een schools had a student population greater than 75% white, 12 of which had no individual
minority constituency greater than 10%. The racial breakdown of the district's schoolchildren
was 50.7% white, 36.0% black, 6.8% Hispanic, and 6.5% Native-American or Asian. Id.
41. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1549 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d
1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
42. Id. at 1557. In denying the motion, the district court held that the 1977 declaration of
unitary status was binding as res judicata against the petitioners, and furthermore, that the
school district was still unitary in 1985. Id. at 1555.
43. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1518-19 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
938 (1986). The Tenth Circuit expressly disagreed with the ruling in Riddick v. School Board,
784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986), in which the Fourth Circuit held
that a finding of unitary status and termination of active supervision should serve to dissolve
existing desegregation injunctions. Id. at 534-35, 538-39; see Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1520 n.3.
For a discussion of Riddick, see infra notes 155-161; see also supra note 11 (listing sources that
analyze the effect of a unitary firtfting); L. Kevin Sheridan, Jr., Note, The Unitariness Finding
and Its Effect on Mandatory Desegregation Injunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 551, 567-73
(1987) (comparing the Dowel! and Riddick decisions). Mr. Sheridan concluded that Dowell
focused on the purpose of the original injunction, that Riddick focused on local autonomy, and
that the two approaches should be combined to decide properly the effect of unitary status. Id.
at 572-73.
44. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1523.
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On remand, the district court45 held that the school district had
maintained its unitary status46 and formally dissolved the 1972 injunc-
tion.47 Once again the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.4" Citing
United States v. Swift & Co.,' the court of appeals held that the desegre-
gation decree should be terminated only upon a showing by the school
district of "'dramatic changes in conditions.., that.., impose extreme
and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the obligor.' ,so The school
board sought, and was granted, a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.51
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that a Swift
test for dissolution of the desegregation decree was inapplicable.5 2 A ma-
jority of five justices observed that the proper test for dissolution was
whether the school board had complied in good faith with the decree and
whether the vestiges of de jure segregation53 had been eliminated to the
45. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d
1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
46. Id. at 1515-19.
47. Id. at 1521-22.
48. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1991).
49. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). In Swift, an antitrust case, an injunction was entered under a
consent decree that forbade certain major meat-packing companies from expanding into the
grocery business in order to prevent them from undercutting prices and driving independent
grocers out of business. The injunction was prima facie permanent. Id. at 116.
50. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond
Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1110 (1986)). The
Supreme Court refused to modify the injunction in Swift because the "danger" posed by the
defendants that made the injunction necessary had not been "attenuated to a shadow" and the
defendants were not "victims of oppression." Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. These requirements de-
mand that the "obligor" (the party whose behavior has been enjoined-for example, a school
district forbidden to practice segregation) moving to modify or terminate the injunction pres-
ent "close to an unanswerable case." Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d
803, 813 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
51. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990).
52. Dowell, I11 S. Ct. at 637. In Swift the meat-packers had repeatedly tried to have the
injunction invalidated in the lower courts. Swift, 286 U.S. at 112. The Dowell Court clearly
limited the Swift test for dissolving an injunction to similar cases in which the restrained party
resists the court's order and the prohibited behavior is in danger of recurring. Dowell, 111 S.
Ct. at 636. If the district court had found that the Oklahoma City school board complied with
the desegregation decree and that the board "was unlikely [to] return to its former ways," the
school board should not be required to meet the requirements of Swift in arguing for termina-
tion of the injunction. Id. at 636-37.
53. De jure segregation is segregation directly intended by school authorities, mandated
by law, or otherwise enforced by an official racial classification. In other words, de jure segre-
gation is segregation that has or had the sanction of law. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425
(6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court has held the difference between de jure and de facto segre-
gation to be the "purpose or intent to segregate" on the part of school authorities, which
characterizes de jure segregation. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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extent practicable.5 4 The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the
district court, instructing the trial judge to apply the new standard in
deciding whether to dissolve the decrees. 55
The Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on
the transitional nature of desegregation orders. The Court strongly em-
phasized language from the seminal school desegregation cases Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 11)56 and Green v. County School Board,57
which implied that judicial control of school systems should be tempo-
rary."8 Unlike the injunction imposed in Swift,59 a desegregation decree
should be designed to remedy unconstitutional discrimination and should
be in effect only until relief is achieved.' The Court warned that the
stringent Swift test61 for dissolution of an injunction would "condemn a
school district . . . to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future." 62
Although the Court set no time limit on the operation of desegregation
decrees, it stressed that the school board's compliance with the decree for
a reasonable time was "obviously relevant" 63 to the decision to dissolve.
The Court implicitly instructed the district court to decide whether
the school board would maintain a desegregated systemA4 The Court
reaffirmed, however, that segregation resulting from acts outside the
school board's control 65 was not remediable by judicial action because
such effects presumably did not result from state action in violation of
the Constitution. 6
54. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
55. Id.
56. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
57. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
58. See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637 ("Brown [I1] considered the 'complexities arising from
the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination' . . .. Green also
spoke of the 'transition to a unitary, non-racial system of public education.' ") (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299 and Green, 391 U.S. at 436).
59. See supra notes 49-50.
60. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
63. Id. at 637.
64. The Court first linked past compliance with the unlikelihood of a return to resegrega-
tion, id. at 636-37, then instructed the district court to check for good-faith compliance before
deciding unitary status. Id. at 638.
65. One-race neighborhood schools resulting from de facto residential segregation and not
intentional state action are an example of school segregation outside the control or fault of the
school board.
66. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)).
Residential segregation in Oklahoma City in 1987 was found by the district court to be a result
of private decisions and economics rather than state action. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.
Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the temporary nature of a deseg-
regation decree is compelled by local government's powerful interest in
control over public education.67 The tension between judicial control of
school districts and the interference with local interests caused by intru-
sive remedial action has long been a feature of the struggle toward deseg-
regation.68 In Dowell the Court asserted that the constitutional
allocation of powers necessarily limited judicial control of local educa-
tion strictly to the time required to remedy segregation.69
The Dowell Court had little to say about how the district court
should measure the accomplishment of the desegregation decree. The
district court was directed only to evaluate the fulfillment of the decree
by a check of the school board's past compliance70 and by a determina-
tion of whether the vestiges of past discrimination, as far as practicable,
had been eliminated.71
The elimination of past discrimination and the attainment of "uni-
tary" status,7" said the Court, were to be determined by evaluating at-
tempts to desegregate the six areas of school operations listed in Green v.
County School Board: student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation,
extracurricular activities, and facilities.73 This approach to deciding uni-
tary status had been applied by the district court in its decree of 1977;74
the Supreme Court ordered the district judge to reconsider the same fac-
tors at the time of the new student assignment plan, 1985, before dissolv-
ing the decree.75 Thus, the Court approved a checklist of the six factors
from Green 7 6 as a method for determining whether unitary status has
Ct. 630 (1991). The Tenth Circuit's opinion of that finding was held by the Supreme Court to
be ambiguous, so the question was remanded to the district court for de novo consideration.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638 n.2.
67. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
68. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280-81 ("[T]he federal courts in devising a remedy
must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs
.... "); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 238 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[D]esegregation remedies must remain flexible and other values and
interests [must] be considered."); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("Courts of equity may
properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles [to the transi-
tion to desegregated schools] in a systematic and effective manner.").
69. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 638.
72. See supra note 10.
73. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435
(1968)).
74. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890
F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991).
75. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
76. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
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been attained and the purpose of the desegregation decree fulfilled."
Justice Marshall sharply disagreed with this approach.78 Any stan-
dard for the dissolution of a desegregation decree must, he argued, reflect
the primary aim of Brown I.79 to eliminate the "stigmatic injury" of in-
feriority implicit in segregated education.8" Justice Marshall stressed the
existence of racially identifiable schools" as a characteristic of a segre-
gated system and criticized the majority for not expressly requiring that
all feasible attempts to avoid such schools be exhausted before a court
finds that unitary status has been achieved. 2
Justice Marshall also challenged the majority's argument that the
school board had no responsibility to remedy segregative effects upon
student assignment caused by demographic shifts.8 3 Justice Marshall
contended that present-day residential segregation could not be separated
from seventy-five years of culpable state conduct by Oklahoma in propa-
gating segregation by enforcing a dual school system.84 Residential seg-
regation, the dissenting Justice argued, must also be considered a vestige
of discrimination if past school board actions contributed to such segre-
77. See also Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 534 (4th Cir.) (approving a district
court's review of the six Green indicia in deciding unitary status), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986).
78. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun and Justice
Stevens joined the dissent. Justice Souter did not take part in the decision of the case; the
Court therefore, was split five to three.
One of his former clerks recently quoted Justice Marshall as saying: "You've got to be
angry to write a dissent." Glen M. Darbyshire, Clerking for Justice Marshall, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1991, at 48, 50. Justice Marshall had been angered by aspects of the Court's desegregation
jurisprudence. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 554-55 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that since the California Supreme Court had interpreted the state constitu-
tion as not distinguishing between de jure and de facto segregation, a state constitutional
amendment prohibiting busing as a remedy for de facto segregation deprived state courts of
remedial power by a "racially nonneutral" reallocation of governmental power in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 442-43
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's apparent approval of incre-
mental attainment of unitary status); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 785-86, 802-03 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that residential segregation in Detroit was a result of local
and state education policy and that the majority's refusal to order metropolitan area-wide
desegregation precluded the only effective remedy). His efforts seem especially poignant in
light of Mr. Darbyshire's revelation that Justice Marshall displayed in his office only one me-
mento of his long association with the Court: a miniature reproduction of the New York Times
front-page announcement of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Darbyshire, supra,
at 48.
79. 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954).
80. Dowell, I11 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 645-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
84. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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gation.8 5 Justice Marshall attacked the majority's concern with limiting
the duration of judicial control over public education86 and bitingly char-
acterized the majority's holding as a belief that "13 years of desegrega-
tion was enough.",8 7
Justice Marshall felt that eliminating "stigmatic injury" to segre-
gated schoolchildren must be the primary purpose of a desegregation de-
cree and that a decree should not be dissolved until that purpose is
achieved.88 He clearly prioritized protecting the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of black children over the local government's interest in control-
ling public education. 9
American courts have struggled with the problem of racial discrimi-
nation in public education since 1850.90 The "separate but equal" doc-
trine, announced by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,91 survived
until the middle of the twentieth century. Consecutive cases in 195092
paved the way for the demise of Plessy. In Sweatt v. Painter,93 Heman
Sweatt sought a writ of mandamus to compel officials of the University of
Texas Law School to admit him as a student.94 Texas state courts re-
fused to issue the writ, claiming that a newly opened equivalent school
85. Id. at 646 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. "I also reject the majority's suggestion that the length of federal judicial supervision is
a valid factor in assessing a dissolution." Id. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The concepts
of temporariness and permanence have no direct relevance to courts' powers in this context
because the continued need for a decree will turn on whether the underlying purpose of the
decree has been achieved." Id. at 647 n.l 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 641-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has reached the same con-
clusion when faced with violent resistance to desegregation. See infra notes 108-10 and accom-
panying text. Local interests and the Fourteenth Amendment are more evenly balanced in
contemporary society, however, with moral arguments on both sides of the equation. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
90. See Brown , 347 U.S. 483, 491 & n.6 (1954). In Brown I, mention was made of
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198 (1850), in which a black minor, Sarah
Roberts, challenged Boston's segregated schools on the basis of a state constitutional guarantee
of equality. Roberts, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 204, 206. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court called the constitutional provision a "great principle," but held that Boston could en-
force segregated schools "in the best interests of both [black and white] children" and stated
that racial prejudice would not be cured by school desegregation. Id. at 206, 209.
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950). An earlier case, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938),
began the erosion of Plessy. The state of Missouri, rather than provide a law school for black
students, offered scholarships to black citizens for the purpose of attending out-of-state institu-
tions. Id. at 342-43. The Supreme Court held that a state must provide equal education
within its boundaries. Id. at 345, 349-52.
93. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
94. Id. at 631.
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was available to black students.9" The Supreme Court disagreed. Not
only was the University of Texas Law School materially superior to the
institution open to the plaintiff,96 but it possessed "to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school." 97 On the same day, the Court issued
a similar decision in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.98 G.W.
McLaurin had been admitted to the University of Oklahoma Graduate
School, but under conditions of isolation from white students.99 As in
Sweatt, the Court found "separate" to be unequal. McLaurin, set "apart
from the other students," was "handicapped in his pursuit of effective
graduate instruction."'I"° Again, the inequality was, at least in part, in-
tangible: "[s]uch restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession."' 10 1
The Supreme Court's historic decision in Brown 1102 followed four
years later. 103 The Brown I Court denounced separate school systems as
inherently unequal and unconstitutional, 1" citing injury to segregated
schoolchildren from the imposition of a "feeling of inferiority."' l After
hearing rearguments on how to cure segregated education, the Court in
95. Id. at 632. "Separate but equal" education was rarely equal, see Donald E. Lively,
Separate But Equak The Low Road Reconsidered, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 43 n.3
(1986), and the institutions in Sweatt were no exception. At the time the case was filed, the
University of Texas Law School had 16 full-time professors, a student body of 850, a library of
65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court, and a chapter of the Order of the Coif, the law
school available to the plaintiff had four part-time professors and almost no other resources.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-33. After Sweatt was initiated, a second school for blacks opened with
five professors, a student body of 23, a library of 16,500 volumes, and, by the time Sweatt was
decided, one alumnus admitted to the Texas bar. Id. at 633.
96. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34.
97. Id. at 634. These intangible qualities included the reputation and experience of the
school's faculty and administration, its influential alumni, and its academic prestige. Id.
98. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
99. Id. at 640. The conditions Mr. McLaurin endured seem ludicrous today. He attended
classes with whites, but sat alone at a desk in a room adjoining the classroom; he could use the
library, but could work only at a designated desk away from the main reading room; he could
eat in the school's cafeteria, but only at his designated table and only at times when no whites
were present. Id.
100. Id. at 641.
101. Id.
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
103. For histories of the early desegregation cases and the litigation strategy of the
NAACP, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 70-137 (1987); Nathaniel R. Jones, The Desegregation of Urban
Schools Thirty Years after Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 515, 518-26 (1984).
104. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
105. Id. at 494.
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Brown II delegated to the district courts the equitable power to remedy
this stigmatic injury"'6 because of a need for "flexibility" to "adjust[ ] and
reconcil[e] public and private needs.""0 7 The two Brown decisions left
unanswered specific questions concerning a school district's duty to
change existing policies and the appropriate methods of change.
The Supreme Court's desegregation mandate was openly and some-
times violently defied by segregationists. 10 8  The conflict reached the
point of a constitutional crisis when Governor Orval Faubus dispatched
the Arkansas National Guard to Little Rock's Central High School to
prevent the admission of nine black students.109 The Supreme Court re-
acted swiftly, proclaiming the primacy of the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of schoolchildren over the preservation of local peace.1 10 Failing
at defiance, school districts turned to foot-dragging; changes in the status
quo of segregation were therefore slow in coming. 1 In Green v. County
School Board 12 the Court responded by placing the burden on school
boards "to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch," '13 employing means that "[promise] realistically to work
now." I 4 Green directed district courts to retain jurisdiction over offend-
106. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
107. Id.
108. The reaction in the South has been described as "a panic bred of insecurity and fear."
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 154 (3d ed. 1974). In the
spring of 1956, a joint statement of 101 congressmen, the "Southern Manifesto," vowed "to
use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision [Brown] which is contrary to the
Constitution." KLUGER, supra note 4, at 752. State legislatures poured forth a flood of pro-
segregation acts, and some school districts stopped operations completely rather than admit
blacks. WOODWARD, supra, at 156-67. The violence against the early civil rights movement
was shocking in its intensity and irrationality, See id. at 173-85.
109. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958). In Cooper, the school district had been pre-
pared to comply with court-ordered desegregation for the 1957-58 school year when Governor
Faubus intervened. Id. The district court enjoined Governor Faubus from blockading the
school, and President Dwight Eisenhower sent federal troops to back the order. Id. at 11-12.
Before the 1958-59 school year, however, with school operations thrown into "chaos, bedlam,
and turmoil," the district court allowed the school system to postpone enrolling the nine black
students. This judgment was made on June 20, 1958; within the space of three months the
district court was reversed by the Eighth Circuit and the reversal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 13-14.
110. Id. at 16.
111. WOODWARD, supra note 108, at 173.
112. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
113. Id. at 437-38. Green sets a desegregation goal that, although often read as a call for
balanced student assignment, may contain an element addressing the intangible qualities of
public education: a district must convert to "a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro'
school, but just schools." Id. at 442.
114. Id. at 439.
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ing school districts until segregation was eradicated.115
District courts remained unsure how to carry out Green's mandate
of affirmative action to dismantle dual systems." 6 The Court set forth
guidelines for appropriate equitable remedies in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education."I7 It designated the Green indicia of a
school system's segregative character" as the proper focus of remedial
action,"19 and it restated the goal of desegregation: the elimination of all
vestiges of de jure segregation. 20
The Swann Court was pragmatic in recognizing the tension between
remedial desegregation decrees and local interests. The Court acknowl-
edged community resistance to busing and the desirability of neighbor-
hood schools.' 2 ' The Court identified the influence of past school
segregation on present-day residential segregation, 2 2 but did not require
school districts to change policies and student assignments constantly to
match a shifting urban population once unitary status was achieved. 23
Three years later, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 24 the Supreme
115. Id.
116. See Days, supra note 20, at 1744.
117. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
118. See supra text accompanying note 73.
119. Racial identification of a school on the basis of any one of the six Green factors consti-
tuted a prima facie case of constitutional violation. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. The Swann Court
singled out student assignment for particular attention. Id. at 22-31. Racial quotas for indi-
vidual schools were discouraged, id. at 24, and the Court admitted that the existence of some
one-race schools, taken alone, would not prevent a school system from attaining unitary status.
Id. at 26. The existence of one-race schools, however, would require the school system to
prove that such schools did not arise from intentionally discriminatory student assignment
policies. Id.
120. Id. at 15; accord Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
121. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 30-31.
122. "People gravitate toward school[s] .... The location of schools may thus influence
the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods." Id. at 20-21.
123. Id. at 31-32. Perhaps the Swann Court meant district court jurisdiction should termi-
nate upon the school system attaining unitary status. But see id. ("This does not mean that
federal courts are without power to deal with future problems" should an intentionally segre-
gative act be shown.); id. at 21 (stating that district courts should retain jurisdiction to insure
that school policies do not promote resegregation). It is not clear whether the Court endorsed
retention of limited judicial power in the post-unitary stage, or merely acknowledged that
future suits could be pursued. See Note, supra note 11, at 656 n.21.
124. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Although the school system in Keyes had never been operated as
a statutorily imposed dual system, the Court nonetheless affirmed the district court's finding of
de jure segregation in a portion of the school district. The intentionally segregative acts of the
school district, as a representative of the state, created the constitutional violation. Id. at 198-
200, 212. The Keyes decision is best known for two fundamental concepts in desegregation
jurisprudence. The first is the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation and the
limitation on the power of courts to remedying only the former. Id. at 198. The second is the
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Court addressed a contention by a school board that local interests in
establishing a neighborhood school zoning policy were racially neutral.
The school board claimed that segregative effects on student assignment
under the policy were due to the racial polarization of Denver's residen-
tial neighborhoods, a phenomenon outside the board's control and not a
result of its actions.125 The Court disagreed, affirming the district court's
decision that the board had manipulated attendance zones, teacher as-
signments, and the placement of new facilities with discriminatory in-
tent,'26 and reserved judgment on whether a truly neutral neighborhood
zoning policy that resulted in a substantial number of one-race schools
would be unconstitutional.1 27
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion in Keyes,'28 urged that courts
balance desegregation decrees to achieve their goals while respecting
community interest in neighborhood schools. 129 Justice Powell argued
that the battle to desegregate is often at the expense of public education's
ultimate goal: the best possible education for all children.'30 The all-out
rush to desegregate, while morally laudable, was sapping community in-
volvement in local school systems.13'
Public disillusion with busing may have affected the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence;132 three major desegregation decisions in the
spatial presumption of intent: once de jure segregation in a "meaningful" segment of the
school district is shown, a presumption arises that segregation elsewhere in the district also has
resulted from intentional acts, and a system-wide remedy can be ordered. Id. at 208-09.
125. Id. at 211-12.
126. Id. at 198-202.
127. Id. at 212.
128. Justice Powell concurred in the decision to remand the case to the district court, but
dissented from the majority's retention of the distinction between dejure and de facto segrega-
tion in determining a constitutional violation. Id. at 217-20 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger concurred with the majority's opinion, Justice Doug-
las wrote separately but agreed with Justice Powell's opinion, and Justice Rehnquist wrote a
dissenting opinion.
129. Id. at 244-46 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. See id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell wrote:
The single most disruptive element in education today is the widespread use of com-
pulsory transportation, especially at elementary grade levels. This has risked dis-
tracting and diverting attention from basic educational ends, dividing and
embittering communities, and exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, interracial fric-
tion and misunderstanding. It is time to return to a more balanced evaluation of the
recognized interests of our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert.
Id.
132. As Richard Kluger put it: "'Bussing' replaced 'law-and-order' as the white-backlash
code word of the early Seventies." KLUGER, supra note 4, at 765. By 1974, President Richard
Nixon, who campaigned in 1968 on the slogan of "law and order," had appointed four Jus-
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1970s limited the power of a district court to effect a remedy for segrega-
tion. In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler133 the Court chas-
tised a district judge for requiring a school district to maintain specific
racial quotas in student assignments each year.134 Since the school dis-
trict had complied with the district court's requirement for a year and
then fell into noncompliance only because of factors beyond its control,
the Supreme Court held that the district court had no authority to order
annual readjustment of student assignment."' Under the Court's deci-
sion in Pasadena City, if a school district achieves the objective of a de-
segregation decree in one facet of school operations, the court's authority
over that area is limited, even if the school system has not attained "to-
tal" unitary status." 6
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1)137 the Court reversed a district
court's order to desegregate Detroit's overwhelmingly black schools by
busing children to and from the city's predominantly white suburbs, be-
cause only the city district, and not the suburban districts, had been
found in violation of the Constitution. 3 Although, as Justice Marshall
argued in his dissenting opinion, 139 an interdistrict remedy may have
been the only plan likely to work, an appropriate remedy could not affect
school districts beyond the boundaries of the constitutional wrong.1
4
Absent a showing of intentional interdistrict discrimination,1 41 interdis-
trict busing would not be allowed.1 42 The Milliken I Court again empha-
tices: Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist. These four
Justices held diverse views on desegregation, yet voted together in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974), and Pasadena. City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
133. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
134. Id. at 433-34. The district judge stated that his earlier order requiring student assign-
ment to be adjusted so that the majority of students in any school would not be members of a
minority race was meant to last "at least during my lifetime." Id. at 433.
135. Id. at 431-36.
136. Id. at 436-37. This concept of "partial unitary status" has resulted in confusion over
the meaning of "unitary" and the perceived distinction between a "unitary" school system-a
system with racially-balanced student assignment-and "unitary status"-a system that is
completely desegregated and in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note
10. Some courts have declined to interpret Pasadena City as endorsing partial unitary status,
however, asserting that the Supreme Court meant only to strike down the district court's
overly rigid requirement of racial quotas. See, eg., Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1447
(11th Cir. 1989), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
137. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
138. Id. at 742-45, 752-53.
139. Id. at 802-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 745.
141. The plaintiffs in Milliken I argued that the State of Michigan was responsible for the
segregation of Detroit's schools, and that since state policy had affected both the city and
suburban schools, there was interdistrict responsibility for the segregation. Id. at 722-23.
142. Id. at 745.
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sized local interests: "No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local au-
tonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of com-
munity concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process."143 Three years later, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milli-
ken I1),14 the Supreme Court held that desegregation remedies should
"take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing
their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."14
The tension between desegregative efforts and the desirability of lo-
cal autonomy resulted in a movement to return control of public educa-
tion to local authorities. 1" In Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of
Education 147 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
overruled a district court's refusal to dissolve a nine-year-old desegrega-
tion decree. 48 The Spangler court concluded that the district court
should consider interests in local autonomy when deciding whether to
terminate judicial supervision of a school board. 4 9 The court held that
nine years of compliance had accomplished the decree's goals 50 and that
fears of reversion to discriminatory practices were unfounded. 5'
Although the Pasadena City school board had indicated its intention to
implement a neighborhood school zoning plan that would create a
number of one-race schools, the Ninth Circuit felt that the community
143. Id. at 741-42.
144. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
145. Id. at 280-81. This language implies a need to balance local autonomy against Four-
teenth Amendment rights. See Douglas J. Brocker, Note, Taxation Without Representation:
The Judicial Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins, 69 N.C. L. REV. 741, 752
(1991).
146. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Milliken 1, lamented: "Today's holding, I fear, is more
a reflection of perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitu-
tion .... Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This trend back to local
control may be partly attributed to local concerns about racial destabilization resulting from
white families removing their children from school districts under busing plans. See Riddick
v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525-26 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Christine H.
Rossell & Willis D. Hawley, Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It, in
EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 157-71 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981). The trend was no
doubt accelerated by the Reagan Administration's push to terminate judicial desegregation
plans. See Liebman, supra note 6, at 1465-66.
147. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
148. Id. at 1240-41.
149. Id. at 1241 (citing Milliken I1, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
150. Id. at 1244 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Judge Goodwin wrote the primary opinion in
Spangler. Id. at 1240-42. Judge Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring with Judge Goodwin,
and Judge Anderson concurred with both opinions. See id. at 1242-48 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); id at 1242 (Anderson, J., concurring). Judge Kennedy's opinion may therefore be con-
sidered the opinion of the court.
151. Id. at 1245 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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interests 152 supporting the new plan negated any presumption of discrim-
inatory intent."5 3 The Spangler holding foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's decision in Dowell by rejecting, as inapplicable to desegregation
decrees, a Swift test-a requirement that the danger that prompted the
decree be attenuated and that unforeseen, grievous harm would result
should the decree continue-for dissolution of the district court's
injunction.1 54
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
followed the Ninth Circuit's lead. In Riddick v. School Board 15 1 the dis-
trict court had declared the school system to be unitary and dismissed a
desegregation suit.' 16 When the plaintiffs attempted to reopen the suit,
they were required to prove intentionally discriminatory action by the
school board. 157 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the school board's termination of busing and conversion to a neigh-
borhood zoning plan was not carried out with discriminatory intent"5 8
and that existing residential segregation was not a vestige of de jure
school segregation.' 5 9
Both Spangler1 6° and Riddick16' held that a school district's
152. Cf. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1516-17, 1523 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(discussing the increase in parental and community involvement when busing was discontin-
ued and neighborhood schools were reinstated), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
Ill S. Ct 630 (1991).
153. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1245 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The court also found persua-
sive an official resolution by the school board that disclaimed any intent to discriminate and
resolved to continue afirmative action programs. Id. at 1245-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1245 n.5 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 49-50 and accompany-
ing text (describing the Swift test for terminating injunctions).
155. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
156. The procedural history of Riddick parallels that of Dowell. The initial determination
of unitary status was an unpublished, unappealed order from 1975 that dismissed the case but
did not expressly dissolve the desegregation decree. Id. at 525; Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F.
Supp. 814, 819 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986). Nine years later, when the plaintiffs attempted to reopen the litigation, the district
court held that unitary status was still in place and that the court's jurisdiction had terminated
with the 1975 order. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530; Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 819-20.
157. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 820 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)); cf. Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) (requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory
intent by the school board in the absence of de jure segregation). The Fourth Circuit upheld
the district court's allocation of the burden of proof. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534, 538-39.
158. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 540. The Fourth Circuit agreed that although the neighborhood
zoning plan was installed in part to induce whites to keep their children in the public schools,
the plan was a justifiable attempt to maintain a stable, desegregated system. Id. at 543.
159. Id.
160. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
161. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535.
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achievement of unitary status should terminate judicial oversight of local
education. In Pitts v. Freeman 162 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit agreed, 63 but went further in setting standards for
unitary status. A school district, the Pitts court held, could achieve uni-
tary status only by maintaining desegregation in all six Green areas of
school operations simultaneously for at least three years.164 More impor-
tant, a finding of desegregation in the six Green areas was to be only the
first, mechanical check. "The factors operate, in part, as an indicator of
more intangible vestiges."' 65
The current judicial focus on school desegregation has shifted from
how to remedy a segregated system to an evaluation of the success of
existing remedies and the appropriateness of relinquishing judicial con-
trol over the school district. This change in focus probably was an inevi-
table result of the large number of desegregation suits and the duration of
judicial supervision in these cases.' 66
Local autonomy is lost, at least to some degree, when judicial con-
trol is imposed over public education. Many authorities believe this loss,
combined with disruptive programs like busing, reduces community in-
volvement in education and promotes the withdrawal of students, espe-
cially whites, from public school systems.' 67 Even if it is assumed that
control of public education belongs at a local level, concerns still arise
over how to determine when a formerly dual system has become unitary,
162. 887 F.2d 1438 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
163. Id. at 1445 n.7.
164. Id. at 1446. The "simultaneously" requirement is a clear rejection of an interpretation
of Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976), as allowing
partial unitariness. See Pitts, 887 F.2d at 1446-47; supra note 136 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and Freeman v. Pitts has been docketed for the
1991-92 Supreme Court term; a primary question presented is the validity of the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of Pasadena City. Freeman v. Pitts, 60 U.S.L.W. 3027 (U.S. July 16,
1991) (No. 89-1290). Freeman v. Pitts was argued on October 7, 1991, after this Note went to
press; the reader may find it interesting to see how the Supreme Court disposed of the Pitts test
for unitary status.
165. Pitts, 887 F.2d at 1446. Discussing the use of the six indicia, the court also said:
[Tihe Green factors are not entirely synonymous with the vestiges of past discrimina-
tion. State-imposed segregation affected society much more than any set of judi-
cially-created factors can measure.... Application of the Green factors does not
strip a district court of its responsibility and ability to consider unique circumstances
in each school system. The Green factors approach is a means towards an end.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. Current Status of Federal School-Desegregation Lawsuits, supra note 7, at 18-19. The
majority of desegregation suits were initiated from 1960 to the early 1970s. Id.
167. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 245-46 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539-42 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1516-17, 1523-
24 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
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and thus has earned back its autonomy, and what supervision, if any,
should be retained over a unitary system.
The majority opinion in Dowell eschewed an in-depth, thoughtful
review of what unitary status should entail in favor of an emphasis on the
interests in reinstating local control over schools. Although the Court's
opposition to desegregation plans operating in perpetuity and its rejec-
tion of the Swift test 6 ' may be sound, it gave scant attention to the more
fundamental question of the proper test for dissolution of desegregation
decrees.
The clear mandate of Supreme Court precedent before Dowell re-
quired school districts to remove all vestiges of past discriminatory prac-
tices.169  In Dowell the Court slipped subtly, and perhaps
pragmatically, 170 to requiring the removal of discriminatory vestiges to
the extent practicable.' 7' The Court, however, offered no new insight on
how a district court should measure the continuing presence of "ves-
tiges," or how far "practicable" effort should extend. The Court set forth
the Green indicia of a system's character-student assignment, faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities-as a check-
list for eliminating vestiges of discrimination, 72 a procedure already fol-
lowed by a number of lower courts.1 73 Such an approach lends itself to
quantifying unitary status, since the Green indicia can largely be reduced
to ratios of black to white students and faculty and concrete comparisons
of activities and facilities.
This approach, as Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion,
does not accurately reflect the spirit of the Brown I mandate against seg-
regation.' 4 Ratios and percentages do not reflect the intangible stigmata
of segregation: students' inabilities "to engage in discussions and ex-
168. For a discussion of the Swift test, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
169. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1970) ("The objec-
tive today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segrega-
tion."); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968) ("School boards [must] take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated root and branch. [T]he court should retain jurisdiction until...
segregation has been completely removed.") (citations omitted).
170. See Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 796 ("If judicial remedial efforts are really justified so
long as any harmful effects of discrimination persist, there is the possibility that remedies
might continue almost indefinitely .... Indeed, as a society we will probably never completely
free ourselves from our racial history ... .
171. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
173. See, eg., supra notes 74 & 77 and accompanying text.
174. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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change views with other students," '17 5 the "feeling of inferiority," '176 the
"stigmatic injury." '17 7 Justice Marshall properly advocated a review of
these intangible factors before granting unitary status to a school district;
unfortunately, he set forth only the eradication of one-race schools as a
measurement of intangible injury. 7 ' Although ridding the school system
of one-race schools might include efforts to desegregate beyond the areas
of school operations outlined in Green, the Supreme Court has often
stated that unitary status should not depend on racial quotas or the elim-
ination of one-race schools.179
An appropriate test for unitary status would combine a review of the
six Green indicia as applied in Pitts v. Freeman,80 a requirement that
neighborhood school zones be drawn to maximize integration to the
greatest extent practicable,' and a pointed investigation of community
attitudes toward racially identifiable schools.'8 2 Any attempt to evaluate
175. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). For a discussion of
McLaurin, see supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
176. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
178. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 250-51 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25
(1971).
180. 887 F.2d 1438, 1446 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991); see supra
notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
181. Cf Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 526-27 (4th Cir.) (neighborhood zone plan
that replaced mandatory busing consisted of attendance zones drawn to maximize integration),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
182. Justice Marshall and a number of commentators have advocated prerequisites for uni-
tary status that go beyond the Green indicia. Many of these suggestions touch upon nonquan-
tifiable, intangible aspects of school operations. See, e.g., Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 804 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("What is or is not a racially identifiable vestige of dejure segregation
must necessarily depend on several factors. Foremost among these should be the relationship
between the schools in question and the neighboring community." (citations omitted)); Brown,
supra note 10, at 1162-63 (arguing that if segregative harm is the propagation of invidious
values, determination of unitary status should include the evaluation of (1) commitment of
local officials to change, (2) minority representation on school boards, (3) good faith compli-
ance with decrees, and (4) efforts to eliminate racial bias by varying traditionally "white-ori-
ented" curricula and testing procedures); Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 793 ("A period of sustained
compliance, perhaps an entire generation, is needed for public perceptions about the racial
character of the schools to be transformed."); Williams, supra note 10, at 799-805 (contending
that the Green indicia are "surface vestiges"; "underlying vestiges" such as residential segrega-
tion, poor educational achievement of black students, and segregative effects from the closing
and opening of schools must also be eliminated); Note, supra note 11, at 663, 667 (arguing that
a finding of unitary status must consider the elimination of the threat of resegregation; a
mechanical finding of unitary status does not demonstrate that attitudes have been altered); cf
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1973) (listing community attitudes as a
measurement of segregation).
An interesting question may arise over using community attitudes to measure desegrega-
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community attitudes, must, of course, be somewhat subjective, but a dis-
trict court that has been involved in the case for some time is appropri-
ately placed to judge such attitudes. The Dowell court heard testimony
from black school administrators and patrons in an attempt to evaluate
community response to the new assignment plan;1 83 similar techniques
should be used in deciding unitary status.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dowell also differed on the
weight residential segregation should receive as a vestige of de jure school
segregation. Lower courts have attributed contemporary residential seg-
regation to economic and social factors;" a with statutory segregation re-
ceding into history, holding school districts blameless for the lingering
effects of residential segregation on school populations often seems rea-
sonable."' De jure segregation should not always be considered" 'origi-
nal sin,' " whose effects control de facto segregation today.186 Yet even
unitary school districts should be encouraged to draw neighborhood
school zones to maximize integration.18 7 Certainly such efforts should be
required of nonunitary systems. Residential segregation should not be
treated as irrelevant to school zoning. 188
Finally, the Dowell Court properly recognized that a community's
tion when some members of the black community prefer an all-black school to remain segre-
gated out of pride in its educational successes. See, e.g., Alison Jones, Durham School Rolls
Increase; Hillside High Again All Black, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 1991, at B6.
183. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890
F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
184. Id. at 1511-12.
185. See Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986).
186. Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1513 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 464 U.S. 55, 74
(1980)).
187. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 540 (school board drew neighborhood zones to maximize
integration).
188. In implementing its new neighborhood school plan, the Oklahoma City school district
made no attempt to counteract residential segregation by drawing school zones to maximize
integration. It simply reinstalled the school zones that were in place prior to 1972. The dis-
trict court rather weakly reasoned that the failure to draw new lines was probative of nondis-
crimination against blacks who had moved into the predominantly white zones. Dowell, 677
F. Supp. at 1517.
In the context of the relationship between school segregation and residential segregation,
at least one school district has not claimed helplessness. The Palm Beach County, Florida
public school system initiated a plan that calls on the county's incorporated communities and
unincorporated developments to achieve racially balanced neighborhoods in exchange for a
return to neighborhood schools. William Celis III, District Finds Way to End Segregation and
Restore Neighborhood Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at B8. This "carrot on a stick"
approach has been well received locally and hailed as novel and comprehensive by academics.
Id. In a test for unitariness that considered intangible factors and community attitudes, volun-
tary, extra efforts to desegregate, like the Palm Beach County plan, would certainly be more
persuasive than mere compliance with court-ordered plans.
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interest in schools is important. Persuasive arguments have been made
for the great benefits that flow from parental involvement in education,
an interest that suffers when children are bused to distant schools. 189
The return of local autonomy may be achieved upon a finding of
unitary status by ending active supervision by the courts. Limited reten-
tion of jurisdiction, perhaps through a narrowly drawn permanent in-
junction prohibiting specific discriminatory acts,19 would not overly
burden local autonomy. Alternatively, courts could relinquish active
management of school operations, but retain a presumption of discrimi-
natory intent should the school district's action result in resegregation. 191
Retention of mechanisms that favor plaintiffs may prove problematic to
the actual use of local autonomy, however. Typically, upon regaining
autonomy a school system wishes to end busing and reinstate neighbor-
hood school zoning,"' acts that commonly have resegregative effects.
Mechanisms favoring plaintiffs should be made less difficult to overcome
if the unitary school district, as justification for its acts, can show com-
munity support for such programs from both the black and the white
population, system-wide educational benefits, and programs that have
been designed to minimize resegregative impact.1 93
189. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 251 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the disruption in education caused by extensive bus-
ing); Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1523-24 (citing statistical improvements in education, linked to
increased parental involvement with neighborhood schools). Justice Marshall points out in his
dissent, however, that such concerns are best dealt with by formulating and modifying desegre-
gation decrees, not by dissolving them. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 n.1, 648 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
190. See Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. REs. L.
Rnv. 41, 61-64 (1986). Mr. Terez suggests that a finding of unitary status should necessarily
include a permanent injunction requiring maintenance of the unitary system. The school dis-
trict would bear the burden of proving a "substantial change in law or facts" before taking
action that might disrupt the unitary status. Id. Similarly broad suggestions have not been
accepted in influential cases, however. The plaintiffs in Spangler requested that if the court
terminated the regulatory injunction over the school district, it should instate a prohibitory
injunction against the reemergence of discriminatory policies. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
proposal as too burdensome for the school district. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
611 F.2d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979).
191. See Note, supra note 11, at 668-70. The author of the cited Note proposes a post-
unitary burden allocation that would only require the plaintiff to make a prima facie case of
substantial resegregative effects. Such a case would result in a rebuttable presumption that the
school district acted with discriminatory intent.
192. See, eg., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
938 (1986); Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1243-44; Dowell, 677 F. Supp. at 1505.
193. Before unitary status is achieved, if a school district acts for putatively beneficial rea-
sons (for example, by opening new facilities or using neighborhood attendance zones) but the
acts result in resegregation, not only is the school district required to show lack of discrimina-
tory intent, but the legitimate reason for the act must be balanced against the plaintiffs' right to
a full remedy. See Note, supra note 11, at 660-61. A post-unitary presumption of intent by the
[Vol. 70
DESEGREGATION ORDER TERMINATION
The Supreme Court's preoccupation in Dowell with ending desegre-
gation decrees may properly serve local interests, but in its ruling the
Court ignored the spirit of the Brown mandate of equal education for all.
A greater emphasis on the intangible qualities of public education and
retention of a passive supervisory role for the federal district courts may
serve both goals more effectively, and hasten the day when our integrated
society can say-triumphantly-"It is finished." '194
WILLIAM L. CHRISTOPHER
school board when its actions substantially resegregate may be justified to relieve plaintiffs of
the difficulty of proving the school board's intent. Granting unitary status only after investiga-
tion into the moral commitment of the community to resist resegregation may help allay fears
that the school board will backslide into intentional segregation, and justify allowing the
school district to rebut the presumption of intent by simply showing legitimate community
benefit from its acts without balancing that benefit against Fourteenth Amendment rights.
194. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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